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"COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM" AGAIN: STATE AND
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OF EXISTING AND FUTURE FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS: I
SAMUEL MERMIN*
THE, problem of integrating our triple-layered sovereignties into a
"cooperative federalism" has been with us since the inception of the
federal system, and more recently has been the subject of considerable
scholarly attention. 1 The practical desirability of such integration has
long been apparent; for, in the fulfillment of broad national policy,
supplementation of the federal power -ith the energy and experience
of local administrative, judicial, and police systems in areas of con-
current responsibility can be invaluable. Attempts to effect coordi-
nated intergovernmental action ha-,e not been infrequent. As the Su-
preme Court approvingly observed in 1883, the federal government has
"from the time of its establishment ...been in the habit of using,
with the consent of the States, their officers, tribunals, and institu-
tions as its agents" 2 to achieve the larger national goals. 3 Under the
pressure of recent wartime needs, new impetus was given to one im-
portant technique of intergovernmental cooperation: the "adoption"
and enforcement within its jurisdiction-by one sovereignty of the laws
or regulations of another sovereignty on a given subject matter. Spur-
* Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma Law Scheol; B.A. Yale 1933, LLB. 1936;
formerly Solicitor, Litigation Division, Enforcement Department, OPA. The author has
felt free to draw on the briefs he prepared for the Price Administrator on some of the mat-
ters discussed herein.
1. See GLAPx, THE RIsE or A NEW FEDER.ALis. (1938); KALLEDmAciI, FED-tAI.
CooPEaRATox WrrH THE STATEs UNDER THE COMERc E CLAusE (1941); Symposium on
Cooperative Federalism, 23 IowA L. REv. 455 (1938); Corwin, A'ational-Slate Cooper-
ation-Its Present Possibilities, 46 YAr.E L. J. 599 (1937), reprinted in 3 Ass', or A4.im
LAW SCHOOLS, SELECTED ESSAYS ozN CoNSTITUIroNA LAw 973 (1938); Grant, The
Scope anzd Nature of Concurrent Power 34 Co.. L. R-Ev. 995 (1934), reprinted in 3
Ass'N oF AMER. LAW ScHooLs, SELEcTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 784 (1938);
Koenig, Federal and State Cooperation Under the Consitution, 36 Micir. L. REv. 752
(1938); Commelit, 56 YALE L. J. 276, 299-302 (1947); Notes, 34 CoL. L REv. 1077
(1934); 33 1icH. L. Ray. 597 (1935).
2. United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 519 (1S&3) (upholding authority of Con-
gress, in exercise of eminent domain, to use state courts to determine value of property).
3. For exmmples of state and local cooperation with the federal government, see
notes 42,53, 56,57 infra.
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red on by a certain amount of exhortation from the OPA, I a few states
and scores of municipalities implemented the enforcement of federal
price, rent and rationing regulations, by enacting legislation prescrib-
ing local penalties for violation of the federal regulations. I It is the ppur-
4. Thus, Deputy Administrator for Enforcement Thomas I. Emerson testified in
1944 before the House Banking and Currency Committee (Hearings on H. R. 4376, 78th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 155): "In addition to the other Federal agencies, we have done our
best to procure the cooperation of State and local enforcement officials. For one thing
we have encouraged the States to pass laws, State laws, which make it a violation of
the State law to violate an OPA regulation.
"We have also encouraged the cities and municipalities to pass similar laws. New
York, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin have passed such laws, and 59 cities have passed
municipal ordinances. Those are extremely important to us. They provide a prompt and
efficient method of handling many of the smaller violations such as occur among the
retail trade ....
"In addition to legislation, we have obtained very substantial help from other en-
forcement officials in the States and municipalities. Many of the States and cities have
assigned policemen to work with us on our counterfeiting problems. Others have as-
signed us help on gasoline. We have used weights and measures inspectors in cities,
and the market inspectors."
The Office of Price Administration did not attempt a largescale sustained campaign.
It was not successful in obtaining affirmative sponsorship of its model state law and
municipal ordinance from the Council of State Governments or the National Association
of Municipal Law Officers. One of the unfavorable points of view encountered by the
Office is typified by this fragrant editorial, entitled, "A Bum Ordinance," from the Feb-
ruary 1944 issue of the Iowa State League of Municipalities' magazine, American Mi-
nicipalities: "The OPA is reported to have sent out an ordinance, to the cities and towns,
making it an offense to violate any rule of the OPA. This is just another example of
the imbecility of the long hairs down at Washington. A city or town has no power
whatever to pass an ordinance making it an offense for violating a rule of some crazy
individual at Washington and, even if they did have the power, it would be ridiculous to
make it an offense to violate some rule of the OPA that no one knows anything about.
If you have received'such an ordinance play safe and pay no attention to it. This ordl-
nance is an example of the almost universal stupidity of many of the half-baked indi-
viduals who have been called to Washington but who would be doing the country a lot
more good if they were out digging ditches, as that would be more in keeping with their
mentality."
5. Texts of the various state laws and ordinances are set forth in 1 Pux. &
FIscHEa OPA SERv., (General Desk Book) 5001-6516. The state laws were those of
New York (covering price and rent), California (rationing), Rhode Island (rationing)
and Wisconsin (rationing). Ordinances numbered over 80, but 25 in the State of Ohio
were invalidated in April, 1945, by the decision holding the Cleveland ordinance uncon-
stitutional. City of Cleveland v. Piskura, 145 Ohio St. 144, 60 N.E.2d 919 (1945).
The ordinances generally covered price and rationing violations; a number specifi-
cally mentioned rent violations, and even where they did not, it was the assumption of
some local courts that a reference to "commodity or service" was sufficient to cover
rental of housing accommodation.
In the overwhelming majority of ordinances, there was no requirement that the
violation be wilful before the penalty became applicable. The same was true of the state
laws of Rhode Island and Wisconsin, and was possibly true of the New York statute,
The ambiguity in New York arises from the fact that §101 (6) of the New York War
Emergency Act made punishable as an infraction any wilful violation not made punish-
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pose of this article to consider the validity of this technique of ancillary,
adoptive legislation, upheld by the New York Court of Appeals G and
the Supreme Courts of Michigan 7 and Porto Rico 8 but found uncon-
stitutional by the Supreme Court of Ohio. 0
The test cases and the problems they raise have, it is submitted, a
significance extending beyond the emergency period. The validating
decisions are of particular interest in the light of the fact that consti-
tutional lawyers have generally considered attempts by a state or city
to penalize the violation of a federal requirement, as the latter may be
amended from time to time, an improper delegation of power to the
able as a misdemeanor or infraction "in any of the preceding subdivisions of this section,
or by or pursuant to any other provision of this act." The State War Council resolution
(pursuant to § 7 (6) of the Act authorizing the Council to adopt various federal regula-
tions and "to adopt rules and issue orders with respect to ... enforcement...')
adopted the regulations under the Price Control Act and provided in §2 that violations
be punishable as infractions. This, it may be argued, made violations punishable as in-
fractions "pursuant to any other provision of this Act" within the meaning of §101 (6)
above referred to; hence the penalty established by §101 (6) itself, for wilful violations
not otherwise made punishable, is inapplicable, and the provision of the resolution that
"every violation" (i.e. regardless of wilfulness) is an infraction, is applicable. The
Court of Appeals in People v. Mailman, 293 N.Y. 887, 59 N.E2d 790 (1944), apparently
assumed that the applicable penalty provisions were those of §101 (6) of the Act rather
than §2 of the resolution; indeed the complaint charged violation of the resolution and
§101 (6) of the Act. See also note 14 infra.
The size of the penalties varied considerably among the ordinances and laws. The
maximum fine varied from $10 (Middlesborough, Ky.) to $500 (e.g. Detroit) and the
maximum imprisonment varied from 10 days (e.g. Mht. Sterling, Ill.) to 5 years (some
offenses under the California law). The penalty under the New York law and pursuant
resolution was up to $2 5 fine and/or up to 5 days' imprisonment. The New York City
Ordinance (Local Law No. 34) had a penalty of up to $100 fine and/or up to 30 days'
imprisonment; the ordinance applicable only to wholesalers or middlemen (Loal Law
No. 35) had a penalty of up to $500 and/or up to 90 days' imprisonment.
In most cases, the prohibitions applied at all levels of distribution; but in some in-
stances (e.g. some ordinances in West Virginia and New Jersey, and those in Yonkers
and Troy, N.Y.) price-control was at the retail level only. Generally the price-control
penalties applied only to sellers, but in some instances (e.g. New York City) to con-
mercial purchasers as well. The ultimate consumer was not penalized as to any illegal
price or rent transaction, and only in a few ordinances was he penalized as to rationing
transactions (in West Virginia; Troy, Yonkers, New York City; Mt. Sterling, IlL;
Sioux City, Iowa; Houma, Louisiana).
Most ordinances also provided that municipal business licenses could be suspended
upon violation of the ordinance.
6. People v. Mailman, 293 N.Y. 887, 59 N.E.2d 790 (1944), affinming 182 Misc. 870,
49 N.Y.S.2d 733 (App. Part, Sp. Sess. 1944) (state law) ; accord, People v. Lewis, 295
N.Y. 42, 64 N.E.2d 702 (1945) (city ordinance).
7. People v. Sell, 310 Mich. 305, 17 NAV.2d 193 (1945) (three judges dissenting).
S. Irizarry v. District Court of Ponce, 2 PBrE & Fiscue OPA Op. & Drc. 2195
(1944).
9. City of Cleveland v. Piskura, 145 Ohio St. 144, 60 N.F2d 919 (1945) (one judge
dissenting).
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federal government; and there is strong authority for that view. 10 In
addition, there are substantial questions as to whether the constitu-
tional provisions of some states prohibiting incorporation of other laws
by reference would be a barrier; whether differences between the fed-
eral, state and municipal provisions, with respect to the size of the pen-
alty or the scope of the prohibition (e.g. the municipal omission of a
federal or state requirement that there be wilfulness before the penalty
is applicable), constitutes such a conflict or inconsistency as to invali-
date the law of the lesser jurisdiction; whether Congress "occupied
the field" by the federal acts governing price and rent control and ra-
tioning so as to invalidate, without more, any local legislation on the
subject; and whether, finally, the police power or any other power of
states and cities is ample enough to regulate so all-embracing a field
of economic activity. Problems of double jeopardy also suggest them-
selves, but they have not arisen in these cases; and in any event would
be insubstantial in most jurisdictions." With the exception of double
jeopardy, each of the foregoing issues is considered below, with prin-
cipal attention given to the problem of delegation.
THE ISSUE OF DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE PoWER
Of all the objections made to the adoptive statutes and ordinances,
the most prominent, and most difficult to deal with, is the objection
that they make an invalid delegation of legislative power to the federal
government. In other words, when an ordinance or state law permits
some unknown future change in federal regulations to determine what
shall be an offense against the city or state, the local legislative body
is said to be abdicating its legislative function. This was the view of
the Ohio court in City of Cleveland v. Piskura. 12 However no invalid
delegation was found to exist by the highest courts of New York, Mich-
igan or Porto Rico. While the opinions of the three latter courts show
the influence of the special nature of the Emergency Price Control Act,
10. See Note, 133 A.L.R. 401 (1941) ; Darweger v. Staats, 267 N.Y. 290, 196 N.E.
61 (1935) ; Opinion of the Justices, 239 Mass. 606, 133 N.E. 453 (1921) ; State v. Vino
Medical Co., 121 Me. 438, 117 AtI. 588 (1922), and State v. Gauthier, 121 Me. 522, 118
At. 380 (1922) ; Uhden, Inc. v. Greenough, 181 Wash. 412, 43 P.2d 983 (1935) ; Smith-
berger v. Banning, 129 Neb. 651, 262 N.W. 492 (1935) ; Hutchins v. Mayo, 143 Fla. 707,
197 So. 495 (1940) ; Florida Industrial Commission v. State, 155 Fla. 772, 21 So.2d 599
(1945) ; Holgate Bros. Co. v. Bashore, 331 Pa. 255, 200 At. 672 (1938).
11. As to prosecutions by the federal government on the one hand, and state or city
government on the other, see United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922) and cases
cited therein; Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926). As to state plus city prose-
cutions, see 3 McQuLLIN, LAw oF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1943, Kearney)
§934; Grant, Penal Ordinances in California 24 CALIF. L. REV. 123, esp. 123-8 (1936) ;
Notes, 48 A. L. R. 1106 (1927); 22 A.L.R. 1551 (1923). But cf. the rule in federal
plus territorial prosecutions, Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907); Puerto
Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 264 (1937).
12. 145 Ohio St. 144, 60 N.E.2d 919 (1945).
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they rest also on other principles, discussed below, which have applica-
tion to the normal peacetime situation.
(a) Before discussing the merits of the objection to in futuro adop-
tion, it may be well to consider a preliminary type of delegation which
may be present in this adoptive legislation: the delegation by a state
or city to an intermediary administrative or executive agency of the
same sovereignty of the authority to determine whether and to what
extent federal regulations shall be adopted. Thus Section 7 (6) of the
New York State War Emergency Act empowered the State War Coun-
cil to "adopt and promulgate in this state any rationing, freezing, price
fixing or other order or regulation imposed by the authority of the
federal government" 13 and "to adopt rules and issue orders with re-
spect to the enforcement" thereof. 14 This provision and the War Coun-
13. NEW Yonn VAR EmERGENCy AcT, §7(6).
14. This latter phrase can be read, as indicated supra note 5, to mean that the War
Council was being given authority to determine what penalty should be applicable to
violations of its orders. Such a reading is supported by the following considerations:
(1) §101-a of the Act gives certain courts jurisdiction over "violations constituting
misdemeanors or infractions under this act or undcr any rule, regulation or order duly
promulgated pursuant to this act, committed within the territorial jurisdiction of such
courts." (emphasis added) (2) The War Council had been given its powers under §7(6)
in the year before §101(6) was enacted providing for punishment of certain wilful io-
lations. (3) §101(6) provides for punishment of wilful violations not made punishable
by §101 "or by or parsuant to any other provisions of this act," (emphasis added) sug-
gesting that the "pursuant to" refers to §7(6). Hence the War Council was authorized,
"pursuant to" § 7(6) to declare as it did that "every viofalfoi of any such regulations or
orders shall constitute and be an infraction of this order, triable and punishable pursuant
to the provisions of the New York State War Emergency Act, as amended." (By
"triable" the Council -as evidently referring to the court jurisdiction provided for in
the Act, e.g. § 101-a, and by "punishable" to § 102 which was headed "punishment for
infractions," and provided that "any person convicted of an infraction as defined by this
act shall be punished by a fine of not more than twenty-five dollars or five days in jail
or both.") The alternative reading of the above-quoted part of the resolution is to say
that it is merely hortatory or educational, calling the public's attention to the statutory
penalties. (4) In 1946, in incorporating into the general business law the substance of
the War Emergency provisions with regard to price, rent and rationing regulations, the
legislature provided (L. 1946, c. 405) that "any person who shall violate" (rather than
-wilfully violate) a regulation under the Emergency Price Control Act as amended was
punishable by fine up to $25, or up to 5 days in jail or both.
If the indicated construction is correct, then another constitutional problem would be
raised by the New York legislation: delegation of the legislative power to create penalties.
See, e.g., People v. Ryan, 267 N.Y. 133, 195 N.E. 822 (1935) ; People v. Grant, 267 N.Y.
50S, 196 N.E. 553 (1935). Since the Council was composed of several leading legislative
as well as executive officials including the President pro tempore of the Senate, the
Senate minority leader and Senate Finance Committee Chairman, the Speaker of the
Assembly, and the Chairman of the Assembly Ways and Means Committee, it might
have been regarded as a "quasi-legislative"' agency not amenable to the rule against
administrative creation of penalties. In addition it is significant that the legislature in
§100 (d) of the Act declared that "the penalty or punishment" imposed for infractions
"shall not be deemed for any purpose a penal or criminal penalty or punishment."
1947]
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cil's resolution adopting and promulgating the regulations issued under
the Emergency Price Control Act were upheld by the New York Court
of Appeals in People v. Mailman. 11 The lower court whose decision
was affirmed without opinion in that case did not discuss the validity
of the delegation to the War Council. The delegation seems at first
blush rather difficult to defend because of the lack of any apparent
"standards" to guide the Council's discretion in the creation of pro-
hibitions. However, (1) the Council's discretion was strictly confined
in the sense that the Council was not authorized to vary the content
of the promulgated regulation from that of the federal regulation;
(2) the Council was not authorized to create any new prohibitions
previously inapplicable to the inhabitants of the state. The federal
wartime regulations were already the law of the land, applying alike
in interstate and intrastate commerce. Nevertheless, it was true that
the Council's discretion was unconfined by any legislative standards
governing the circumstances under which and the extent to which the fed-
eral regulations were to be adopted.
An analogous though somewhat more careful use of an intermediary
agency for purposes of adoption of federal regulations was involved
in Brock v. Superior Court, 11 where the California court sustained a
state agricultural adjustment act which empowered the state director
of agriculture, after hearings, to issue licenses if there existed a corre-
sponding federal marketing agreement or license for the particular
business and if the administrative officials under the state license in-
cluded only those holding corresponding positions under the federal
order, and to approve of marketing agreements which conformed with
the terms of the federal marketing agreement. Here, as in the Mailman
,case, there were no strict standards to govern the agency's discretion,
but the court felt that the law clearly stated its purposes (prevention of
waste through disorderly marketing, raising of the price level to a
specified point, equal opportunities to growers and producers in the
available market) and adequately specified the necessary prerequisites
of a corresponding federal regulation with like terms and an agency
with like personnel, so that the director, after hearing, could adequately
In People v. Mailman, 293 N.Y. 887, 59 N.E.2d 790 (1944), the Court of Appeals
apparently assumed, as did the court below, that the applicable penalty provisions were
those of §101 (6) rather than §2 of the resolution. This view was taken in all the briefs
filed in support of the law in the Mailman case; and the complaint charged violation of
the resolution and § 101 (6) of the Act. Thereafter, after more intensive consideration
of the statute, the Price Administrator urged the other view and persuaded the Appellate
Part, Special Sessions to adopt'it. People v. Lewis, 186 Misc. 921, 928 (App. Part, Sp.
Sess.), aff'd on other grounds, 295 N. Y. 42, 64 N.E.2d 702 (1945).
15. 293 N.Y. 887, 59 N.E.2d 790 (1944), afflrming 182 Misc. 870, 49 N.Y.S,2d 733
(App. Part, Sp. Sess. 1944).
16. 9 Cal.2d 291, 71 P.2d 209 (1937).
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and within reasonable limits exercise his judgment whether the federal
regulations conformed to the intent of the state law.
The Brock case illustrates the modem trend to uphold the adequacy
of standards which state an "intelligible principle" 2- to guide the ad-
ministrative agency, though the principle may be broad enough to
permit very wide discretion in the administrative agency. 18 The case
is even more important for pointing to one method of avoiding the
delegation problem involved in infuturo adoption of federal regulations:
the creation of a state agency to determine, under prescribed standards,
whether and to what extent the federal regulations are to be adopted,
including a new determination whenever the federal regulations change.
As the court emphasized, the California law involved "no automatic
incorporation by reference of future federal laws, but a declared policy
of making our law correspond with federal regulation under circum-
stances set forth in our statute, and an adequate, constitutional means
for carrying that policy into effect."' 9
The intermediate agency device has, of course, its limitations. Since
every change in the pertinent federal regulations must be evaluated
by the state agency prior to adoption, the device is practically useless
in the OPA type of situation, where the constant amendment of thou-
sands of federal regulations would seem to require continuous and im-
possibly speedy reevaluation by the local agency of the federal pattern
of control. This factor in addition to the potential local confusion in-
herent in the partial adoption and enforcement of federal requirements
was doubtless influential in causing the New York State War Council,
on April 28, 1943, to adopt "all" regulations of the Price Administrator
under the Emergency Price Control Act. .
In the Brock case, as has been stated, the court upheld the alleged del-
egation to the federal government since there was "no automatic incor-
poration by reference of future federal laws". The cases in which the
doctrine of invalid delegation through incorporation of future federal
regulations has been applied, did involve an "automatic" incorpora-
tion. It is to these cases that we now turn.
17. Taft, C. J., in Hampton v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
18. The tendency in the state courts has been more marked in the field of broad,
complex regulations of business activity such as those in the Broek case than in other
fields. See, e.g., Jaffee, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power, 11, 47 Cor. I. RL-.
561, 581-92 (1947). See generally, Note, Pertnissible Limits of Delegation of Leg-
islative Power, in 79 L. Ed. 474 (1935). The sanctioning of very broad standards is
even more evident in the federal cases. See note 46 infra.
19. 9 Cal.2d 291, 298, 71 P.2d 209, 213 (1937) (emphasis added).
20. The War Council's resolution, which was renewed from year to year there-
after, declared in §1, "Solely for purposes of enforcement, all regulations and orders
established by the Price Administrator pursuant to the Emergency Price Control Act of
1942, as amended by Public Law 729-77th Congress and Public Law 151-78th Congress,
are hereby adopted and promulgated in the State of New York."
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(b) One thing to be noted at the outset is that the state or municipal
adoption of existing federal provisions does not fall within the delega-
tion doctrine. It is an obvious and proper convenience for a legislature
which has determined that existing provisions of its own other laws or
regulations should be made applicable, to do so through incorporation
by reference instead of setting them out in full i Congress has often done
this, with Supreme Court approval, 21 and so have the local legislatures
where not inhibited by state constitutional provisions against incor-
poration by reference as a matter of legislative form. 22 The device is
just as convenient and proper when the existing provisions are those
of other sovereignties as it is when they are of the same sovereignty.
Thus, some of the leading cases holding invalid the state adoption in
futuro of federal regulations, also recognize that adoption of existing
federal regulations would be no invalid delegation of legislative power, 3
It is to be observed, moreover, that even where there is a genuine
in futuro adoption, the person attacking such adoption will have no
standing to raise the issue if in fact no change in the adopted require-
ments occurred between the time of adoption and the time of the con-
tested alplication to him (the latter time, in a suit for violation of the
adopting legislation, would be the time of violation). This is because
of the familiar constitutional principle that one who complains of an
unconstitutional aspect of legislation ". . . must show that the alleged
unconstitutional feature injures him," 24 and because, as indicated,
adoption of existing requirements is not an invalid delegation. The
point has been made in at least one of the adoption cases. 26 This "no-
standing" principle may be applicable independently of the severabil-
21. See Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 391-2 (1924) ; Engel v. Davenport,
271 U.S. 33, 38 (1926) ; Alton Railroad Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 15, 19 (1942).
22. This formal requirement, which would be important only in a few states, is
treated in the second installment of this article.
23. Thus in State v. Vino Medical Co., 121 Me. 438, 442, 117 Atl. 588, 590 (1922)
the court said: "We are not aware of any objection on constitutional grounds to the
adoption, by legislative enactment, of any existing definition or standard enacted by
Congress, by which the intoxicating character of liquor shall become fixed by law in
this state." (emphasis added) Again, in Hutchins v. Mayo, 143 Fla. 707, 713, 197 So.
495, 498 (1940) the court said: "We do not question the authority of the Legislature to
make optional the regulations of the ... [federal agency] . . . as they then existed."
See to the same effect, Green v. City of Atlanta, 162 Ga. 641, 135 S.E. 84 (1926) ; Scot-
tish Union and National Insurance Co. v. Phoenix, 28 Ariz. 22, 235 Pae. 137 (1925).
24. Premier-Pabst Sales Co. v. Grosscup, 298 U.S. 226, 227 (1936).
25. "To date there has been but one piece of national legislation on the subject in
hand-the Volstead Act, and this was passed prior to the present indictment; appellant,
not being harmed by any change in the law since its first pronouncement, cannot com-




ity of the adopting legislation as between existing and future require-
ments. 216 At any rate, such severability can generally be urged, and
has often been successfully urged, in the adoption cases, - to sustain
the legislation insofar as existing requirements were adopted.
In the ensuing discussion, it is assumed that a state or municipal
prohibition against violation of present and future federal administra-
tive regulations under a named federal statute is an inzfutlro adoption.
It is of course possible to argue that the basic requirements adopted
are those of the statute (particularly if the local statute so states), and
insofar as the federal regulations conform to the statutory standards,
prohibiting violation of a subsequently changed federal regulation is
still merely an adoption of existing federal requirements-namely those
of the statute itself; hence only if the statute has undergone pertinent
amendment by the time of the violation would there be an in futuro
adoption problem. However, the cases holding in fiutro adoption in-
valid do not rest upon any distinction between statute and regula-
tion. Nor, unless the federal regulations were of a quite minor nature,
would it be realistic to stress the distinction.
Coming then to the in futuro adoption problem, there is more than
one theory by which such adoption can be defended against the charge
of invalid delegation.
(1) Contingencwy tkeory: One of the early theoretical tools used in
dealing with the delegation issue was the judicial principle that the
legislature may, without being guilty of an invalid delegation, make
a complete law take effect upon the happening of a "fact" or "contin-
gency," and may delegate the authority to determine the happening
of that fact or contingency. 29 As the doctrine developed, it came to
be applied even in some situations where the determination of the par-
ticular "fact" or happening of the particular "contingency" depended
upon the exercise of judgment and discretion by a delegate-e. g. the
26. In numerous cases the "no standing" doctrine has been applied without discussion
of severability of the provision involved. And there are some rather explicit rejections
of the idea that severability has anything to do with the question of legal standing.
See, e.g. Yazoo and Miss. R.R. v. Jack-son Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 219-20 (1912) ;
Dollar Co. v. Canadian C. and F. Co., 220 N.Y. 270, 282-3, 115 N.E. 711, 714-5 (1917).
27. Scottish Union & Nat Ins. Co. v. Phoenix Title and Trust Co., 28 Ariz. 22,
235 Pac. 137 (1925) (eliminating adoption of future changes in New York standard fire
insurance contract) ; Green v. Atlanta, 162 Ga. 641, 135 S.E. 84 (1926) as explained in
Featherstone v. Norman, 170 Ga. 370, 395, 153 S.E. 58, 70 (1930) (eliminating adoption
by municipality of future changes in federal pay scales) ; Ex porte Burke, 190 Cal. 32-6,
212 Pac. 193 (1923) (eliminating adoption of future changes in federal Volstead Act).
28. See note 10 supra.
29. E.g. The Aurora, 7 Cranch 382 (U.S. 1813); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649
(1892); Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. 491 (1873); State v. Atlantic Coast Line R., 55 Fla.
617, 47 So. 969 (1908); Elwell v. Comstock, 99 Minn. 261, 109 N.W. 698 (1906) ; State
v. Corvallis & E.R., 59 Ore. 450, 117 Pac. 980 (1911).
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president's judgment as to international tariff relationships, 8" the
judgment of groups of individuals determining whether a law shall
be effective, under "local option" legislation, 11 or the judgment of
sister states, under "reciprocal" or "retaliatory" legislation enacting
taxes or license requirements applicable to foreign corporations or
otherwise making state law dependent on the provisions of other
states. 32
30. Field V'. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892). See Jaffee, supra note 18, at 566 for comment
on the scope of this discretion.
31. Thus in Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. 491 (1873), the court said: "The law did not
spring from the vote, but the vote sprang from the law. . . . To assert that a law is
less than a law because it is made to depend on a future event or act, is to rob the legis-
lature of the power to act wisely for the public welfare. . . . The legislature cannot
delegate its power to make a law, but it can delegate a power to determine some fact or
state of things. . . ." Id. at 498. Again in State v. Parker, 26 Vt. 357, 365 (1854), the
Court said: "If the operation of a law may fairly be made to depend upon a, future con-
tingency then, in my apprehension, it makes no essential difference what is the nature
of the contingency, so it be an equal and a fair one, a moral and legal one, not opposed
to sound policy and so far connected with the object and purpose of the statute as not
.to be a mere idle and arbitrary one .... It seems to me that the distinction attempted
between the contingency of a popular vote and other future uncertainties is without all
just foundation in sound policy or sound reasoning." For a collection of cases on local
option and state-wide referenda legislation (the former have been generally upheld, the
latter generally invalidated), see Note, Permissible Limits of Delegation of Legislative
Power, 79 L. Ed. 474, 560-73 (1935).
32. Clay v. Dixie Fire Ins. Co., 168 Ky. 315, 181 S.W. 1123 (1916) ; Phoenix Ins,
Co. v. Welch, 29 Kan. 672 (1883) ; Home Ins. Co. v. Swigert, 104 Ill. 653 (1882) ; State
v. Ins. Co., 115 Ind. 257, 17 N.E. 574 (1888) ; Texas Co. v. Dickinson, 79 N. 5. L. 292,
75 At. 803 (1910) ; State v. Davis, 132 Ohio St. 308, 7 N.E.2d 652 (1937) ; Interstate
Trucking Co. v. Damman, 208 Wis. 116, 241 N.W. 625 (1932) ; People v. Fire Ass'n of
Philadelphia, 92 N.Y. 311 (1883), aff'd, 119 U. S. 110 (1886).
These are the so-called "reciprocal" or "retaliatory" state statutes which make the
license or tax provisions for foreign corporations operating in State A dependent upon
the analogous provisions of the home State B of such corporations, applicable to cor-
porations of State A operating as foreign corporations in State B. The typical approach
in these cases is shown in the extensive opinion of the New York Court of Appeals up-
holding a New York statute taxing foreign insurance companies on the basis of the tax
imposed by those states on New York companies, in the Fire Association case supea, at
318-9: "But in the statute before us nothing is left to anybody's discretion. That is
certain which can be rendered certain, and the act fixes the tax by reference to an ex-
trinsic fact which determines its amount in excess of a fixed and established rate. Be-
cause that extrinsic fact is the legislation of another State, it does not follow that the
legislative discretion of, such other state is in any manner substituted for our own ...
[W]hat would be certainly constitutional if done seriatim, by several and separate acts,
does it become unconstitutional when the same precise and identical result, founded upon
exactly the same legislative discretion, is accomplished by one?"
State statutes making it unlawful to sell liquor manufactured in a state whose laws
discriminate against liquor manufactured in the enacting state were upheld by the Su-
preme Court wvithout discussion of the delegation issue, which was not raised. Indian.
apolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Commission, 305 U. S. 391 (1939); Finch & Co.
v. McKittrick, 305 U. S. 395 (1939). The issue might have been raised, however, The
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The courts in upholding these laws felt that the ultimate discretion
and judgment was that of the legislature enacting the conditional legis-
lation; that the law was "complete" within the meaning of the rule,
since the relevant contingency was contained within it. As stated in
one of the cases last referred to, involving a "reciprocal" statute: "In
all these cases it is the law of the home government which is enforced,
and the action of the foreign government only makes the contingency
upon which the law becomes operative. There is no difference in prin-
ciple between such contingency and any other which may be provided for
in the statute." 33 On the principle of the cases, then, state and munici-
pal legislation would not be making an invalid delegation of legislative
power if the "contingency" upon which their content and effectiveness
depended was the existence of certain federal legislative or administra-
tive requirements.
(2) Theory of standards: The more modern and familiar principle by
suits were federal court suits for injunctions to restrain enforcement because of alleged
violation of the commerce clause, and of the due process and equal protection clauses of
the 14th Amendment. The due process contention apparently did not include, as other
state delegation cases in the Supreme Court have, a contention that the delegation was
so arbitrary as to violate federal due process. See Jefferson, The Suprene Court ard
State Separation and Delegation of Powers, 44 Coi. L. Rnv. 1 (1944). Another type of
reciprocal statute enacted in several states is one which allows aliens who are non-resi-
dents of the United States to inherit property within the jurisdiction only if their re-
spective countries grant reciprocal rights to American citizens. See Note, 56 Y=sz I- J.
150 (1946). These do not seem to have been attacked as invalid delegations to a foreign
country. Still another type was involved in Texarkana v. Arkansas Gas Co., 305 U. S.
188 (1939). The city of Texarkana, Texas, had granted a utility franchise which pro-
vided that if the company should be compelled to (by Arkansas authorities), or should
voluntarily, establish rates for the adjacent city of Texarkana, Arkansas, vhich vere
less than those fixed by the franchise, such lower rates should apply also in Texarlana,
Texas. The Supreme Court rejected the delegation objection by saying: "It is true,
extra-state action determines that the rate shall lessen; but the council has power over
the rates at all times." Id. at 197.
33. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Welch, 29 Kan. 672, 678 (183) (italics added). The court
evidently did not mean to imply anything more than that the action of another govern-
ment was no less properly a "contingency" than some other non-governmental action.
It did not mean that the power to base the effect of a law upon a contingency was un-
limited. Thus, as the N. Y. court observed in the Fire Associatim, case, supra note 32
at 322: "But it is said the doctrine thus asserted would permit one state to adopt the
law of another state, together with its future changes, by one sweeping enactment; and,
for an example, that New York might enact that the rate of interest here for the loan of
money should be such and the same as that which should be from time to time prescribed
by the law of Maine. These are seeming, but in reality false, analogies. They are pure
cases of an abdication of its functions by the legislature and of an unwarranted delegation
of its authority. But that is so because there is no dependent or causative connection
between the domestic and the foreign law .... and because .... the event upon
which the law is made to take effect is not one on which the expedience of the law, in
the judgment of the lawmakers, depends. In other words, no legislative judgment is
involved."
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which delegations of legislative power are tested is the adequacy of the
standards laid down by the legislature to control the action of the dele-
gate. .4 In the ordinary case of delegation by a legislature to an admin-
istrative agency of the same sovereignty, the blanket objection is not
made that the legislature cannot properly adopt future administrative
regulations. The administrative agency is given the power to create and
administer regulations in futuro precisely because the legislature feels
itself unable to deal efficiently and expeditiously with future situations
requiring quick, expert action. What preserves the delegation from
unconstitutionality is the fact that the administrative agency's discre-
tion is guided by adequate legislative standards.
Applying that test to the local OPA legislation, it could plausibly be
argued that the legislation was in effect adopting the standards of the
federal acts, in prohibiting violations of regulations issued thereunder;
and the constitutional adequacy of these standards as upheld by the
federal courts under the Federal Constitution 15 is of considerable
weight in determining adequacy of the standards under the various
state constitutions. The Supreme Courts of Porto Rico 11 and Michi-
gan 37 adopted, at least in part, this approach, which had been suggested
in a lower court California case a decade earlier, upholding the Cali-
34. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); United States v. Rock Royal
Co-op, 307 U.S. 533 (1939); Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935); Hampton v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928); People ex rel. Gamber v.
Sholem, 294 Ill. 204, 128 N.E. 377 (1920) ; Michigan Milk Marketing Board v. Johnson,
295 Mich. 644, 295 N.W. 346 (1940); Ferretti v. Jackson, 88 N.H. 296, 188 At. 474
(1936) ; Seignious v. Rice, 273 N.Y. 44, 6 N.E.2d 91 (1936).
35. The standards of the Emergency Price Control Act were upheld in Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944). The
standards of the Second War Powers Act governing the rationing authority were upheld
in numerous appellate and trial courts. See, e.g., O'Neal v. United States, 140 F.2d
908 (C.C.A. 6th 1944), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 729 (1944) ; United States v. Randall, 140
F.2d 70 (C.C.A. 2d 1944).
36. "The Legislature, in adopting by reference the Federal Act, has laid down
broad standards, which the Supreme Court of the United States has upheld despite con-
tentions that the Federal Act constitutes an invalid delegation of legislative power
(Yakus v. United States; Bowles v. Willingham, supra note 35. In also providing
in effect that the Federal regulations to be promulgated by the Administrator under the
Federal statute, shall also be insular regulations, the legislature has simply selected the
Federal Administrator as the administrative official who shall have the power 'to fill up
the details' within the broad but valid standards laid down in the law itself." Irizarry v.
District Court of Ponce, 2 PIKE AND FIscHER, OPA Op. & DEC. 2196, 2199 (Sup. Ct.,
Porto Rico, 1944). While this theory of the court is useful, the decision on delegation
has limited value because it involved a territory. As the Court recognized: "In addition,
... there may be no constitutional objection to action by the Legislature of Porto Rico,
the agent of Congress, in delegating back to Congress, its creator, the authority to legis-
late it originally received from Congress." Id. at 2200. Similarly, cases involving mu-
nicipal adoption of state provisions are not strong authorities on the delegation issue.
37. The court quoted from the Porto Rico decision in this connection. People v, Sell,
310 Mich. 305, 323, 17 N. W.2d 193 (1945).
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fornia law adopting federal NRA codes. 3s If then the standards were
proper, and, as has been stated, the usual delegation to an administra-
tive agency is obviously not invalidated by the fact that it involves a
granting of discretion as to future regulations, then the residual ele-
ment in the objection to such adoptive legislation must come down to
this: the delegation is improper because it is to an administrative officer
of anwther sovereignty. While the Ohio Supreme Court in the Piskura
case felt this was fatal, 39 the Porto Rico and Mlichigan courts thought
otherwise, again following the lead of the lower California court.
For, as the California court observed, "we are a nation, not an alli-
ance of foreign states, and our President is not a foreign potentate." 4
Or, as the Supreme Court said in 1883 of the same state-federal relation,
running in the other direction: use by the federal government of state
instrumentalities "has not been deemed violative of any principle or
as in any manner derogating from the sovereign authority of the federal
government; but as a matter of convenience and as tending to a great
saving of expense." 41 The practice referred to was impressively com-
mon both before and after this case. 42 M.oreover, it is difficult to ac-
38. Ex parte Laswell, 1 Cal. App. 2d 183, 36 P.2d 678 (1934). The California
statute provided for establishment of state codes by a state official for those industries not
covered by federal codes, but provided that any code "approved, prescribed or issued
under Title I of the said Act of Congress commonly known as the National Industrial
Recovery Act for any trade... shall supersede any code or codes approved under the
provisions of this act for such trade.. . and shall immediately become the code of fair
competition provided for in this act for the said trade.., and shall be enforceable as
such under the provisions hereof." Statutes of California, 1933, c. 1037, § 2. The court
in the Laswell case, after observing that the state had declared its policy to cooperate
with the national government in eliminating unfair competitive practices, establishing a
parity in conditions of employment, etc., said of the California statute: "So far as this
case is concerned, we may say that the fcderal statute was adopted by the state and that
it was provided in the adopting statute that when the federal authorities had fixed a
code for the operation of any industry, that code automatically became the state code
therefor." Ex partc Laswell, .mpra at 188, 36 P.2d at 680 (italics added).
39. "Such prices are determined by the Price Administrator, a federal agency, over
whom council has no authority or control. That body did not and could not establish a
policy or fix standards for his guidance. Therefore in the last analysis the offense is
the violation of an order of the Price Administrator. Such an ordinance is invalid be-
cause of its attempted delegation of legislative power to a federal agency." City of
Cleveland v. Piskura, 145 Ohio St. 144, 158, 60 N. E.2d 919, 925 (1945).
40. Ex parte Laswell, 1 Cal. App.2d 183, 203, 36 P.2d 678, 687 (1934).
41. United States v. Jones, 109 U. S. 513, 519 (1883) (italics added).
42. State statutory authorization for the use of federal officials by the states (See,
e.g., employment of Federal Power Commission by state utility commission to make an
investigation for it, upheld in Garvey v. Trew, 170 P.2d 845 (Ariz. 1946)) has not been
as common as the reverse.
Thus, under the Selective Service draft statutes of World War I, considerable ad-
ministrative authority was placed in the hands of state officials, and the contention that
this constituted an invalid delegation of federal legislative power to state officials was
held by the Supreme Court to be "too wanting in merit to require further notice". Arver
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cept the loss of sovereignty argument in face of the fact that delegations
v. United States, 245 U. S. 366, 389 (1918). Nor have the Courts taken the argit-
ment seriously in other similar cases of federal authorization to state and local officials to
discharge federal functions. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275 (1897) (arrests of de-
serting seamen by local justices of the peace) ; Harris v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App, 15,
196 Pac. 895 (1921), Gambino v. United States, 275 U. S. 310 (1927) (participation by
municipal police in enforcement of National Prohibition Act) (and see Executive Order
of May 8, 1926 authorizing the commissioning of state officers as federal agents to assist in
enforcing National Prohibition Act, discussed in Hart, Sonse Legal Questions Growing Out
of the President's Execufive Order for Prohibition Enforcement, 13 VA. L, Rnv. 86 (1926)) ;
enforcing National Prohibition Act, discussed in Hart, Some Legal Questlions Grozing Out
of the President's Executive Order for Prohibition Enforcement 13 VA. L. Rav. 86 (1926) ;
Goulis v. Stone, 246 Mass. 1, 140 N. E. 294 (1923) (arrest warrant and preliminary hear-
ing by state judicial officer for offense under National Prohibition Act) ; Matter of
Spangler, 11 Mich. 298 (1863), Druecker v. Salomon, 21 Wis. 621 (1867) (participation
in administration of Civil War draft statute by governor, county commissioners, and
township assessors); Dallemagne v. Moisan, 197 U.S. 169 (1905) (local police officer
arresting crew-member of foreign vessel, under federal treaty authorization) ; Parker
v. Richard, 250 U.S. 235 (1919), Marcy v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 45 Oki. 1, 144 Pac. 611
(1914) (state court approval as a condition of alienation of lands by certain Indian
heirs) ; United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513 (1883) (state court determination of
value of property taken under federal power of eminent domain) ; Holmgren v. United
States, 217 U.S. 509 (1910); Levin v. United States, 128 F. 826 (C.C.A. 8th 1904);
Indiana v. Killigrew, 117 F. 2d 863 (C.C.A. 7th 1941) ; In re Connor, 39 Cal. 98 (1870) ;
Eldredge v. Salt Lake County, 37 Utah 188, 106 Pac. 939 (1910) (state court conduct
of naturalization proceedings and collection of fees). That the authorization involved
in these cases is to be distinguished from compulsion, see Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet.
539, 621, 630 (U.S. 1842) ; Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66 (U.S. 1860) ; Dallemagne
v. Moisan, supra at 174; Holmgren v. United States, supra at 517; Stephens, Petitioner,
70 Mass. 559,(1855).
Many similar provisions do not seem to have received any specific judicial treatment.
A provision of the Migratory Bird Conservation Act, 45 STAT. 1222 (1929), 16 U.S.C, § 715
(1940), authorizes, under certain conditions, cooperation by state officers in enforcement
of federal regulations, as does the Plant Quarantine Act, 37 STAT. 316 (1912), 7 U.S.C.
§ 156 (1940), and as did the 1906 Food and Drugs Act, 34 STAT. 768, 769 (1906), 21
U.S.C. § 12 (1934) [repealed 52 STAT. 1059 (1938)]. Federal statutes have authorized
local officers to use local warrants in apprehending and returning fugitive slaves, Fugitive
Slave Act of 1850, 9 STAT. 462, have authorized the use of state jails for federal prison-
ers, REv. STAT. §5539 (1875), 18 U.S.C. §693 (1940), 46 STAT. 325-6 (1930), 18
U.S.C. §§ 753b-f (1940), REv. STAT. §§ 5548-50 (1875), 18 U.S.C. §§ 705-7 (1940), the
use of state judicial officers and city mayors to make arrests of federal offenders and take
them before committing magistrates, 31 STAT. 956 (1901), 18 U.S.C. §§ 591, 595 (1940),
the taking by local judicial officers of depositions admissible in federal courts, Rv. STAT.
§ 863 (1875), 28 U.S.C. § 639 (1934) [incorporated in Rule 28(a), FED. R. Civ. P.],
and the issuance by such local officers of subpoenas upon application of a disputant in a
contested congressional election, R-v. STAT. §§110, 112 (1875), 2 U.S.C. §§ 206, 208
(1940) [see In re Loney, 134 U.S. 372 (1890)], and place a "duty" upon state governors
to assist, in a prescribed manner, in the apprehension of interstate fugitives, Rv. SIrAT.
§ 5278 (1875), 18 U.S.C. § 662 (1940), though this may be construed as permissive
rather than mandatory. See Kentucky v. Denison, supra. The Federal Motor Carrier
Act gives important duties to "joint boards" whose membership is composed of nominees
named by state commissions-these nominations and the decisions of the joint boards
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even to non-governmental bodies, when justified by the circumstances,
are upheld as proper.
There is, however, a second use of the "standards" principle which
is even more significant than that above indicated. For it avoids the
"as if" quality of the argument that a state or city has adopted the
standards of a federal act when all that it does explicitly is to prohibit
violations of regulations under the federal act. This second technique
is expressly to embody standards in the local law itself. This might be
done by setting forth, or incorporating by reference, the then existing
standards of the federal act, 4 or adopting independent state standards
against which the action of the federal delegate is to be tested. The
latter technique is illustrated by a recent proposal for "creation of a
national corporation by Congressional statute and the negotiation of
an interstate compact which embodies a delegation to this Corporation
of important state powers over water resources. . . To sustain the
legality of the proposal against attacks based upon the prohibition
against delegations of power, the compact should embody a mandatory
instruction that the delegated authority is to be exercised by the Cor-
being subject to ICC approval. And the ICC may avail itself of the cooperation, services,
records and facilities of the state authorities; and space and facilities in Washington
are to be assigned for national representatives of the state commissions and for the joint
boards. 49 STAT. 543, 550 (1935), 49 U.S.C. §5301, 305 (1940).
For description of cooperation in food and drug administration, interstate game
supervision, ICC matters and others, see CLrnx, RisE op A NEw FrmAmsnas (1938);
Koenig, Federal and State Cooperation Under the Constitution, 36 Mxcii. L. Rnv. 752
(1938) ; Lindahl, Cooperation Between the ICC and the State Commissions in Railroad
Regulation, 33 ,iciH. L. RI-v. 338 (1935) ; Kauper, Utilization of State Corsinissioners in
the Administration, of the Federal Motor Carrier Act, 34 Mxcir. L. REv. 37 (1935) ; and
for cooperation between the TVA and state agencies see Comment, 56 Y=u.n L. J. 276,
287-8 (1947).
For discussion of prohibitions of state constitutions against state employees' holding
offices of trust or profit under the federal government and conclusion that the prohibitions
are inapplicable, see Kauper, supra.
43. See Note, 79 L. Ed., 474, 495-501 (1934) ; Jaffee, Law-Mahing k, Private Groups,
51 HAv. L. Ray. 201 (1937); Note, 37 Co. L. REv. 447 (1937). In addition it is sig-
nificant that state reciprocal statutes making the inheritance rights of alien non-res-
idents dependent upon the legal treatment of American citizens by foreign governments
have not been regarded as abdications of local sovereignty to a foreign sovereignty.
See note 32 supra. It has also been suggested (Comment, 56 YA.= L. J. 276, 301 n. 115)
that alleged transfers of sovereignty are sometimes treated judicially as transfers merely
of "jurisdiction.' See Central R. R. v. Jersey City, 70 N.J.L. 81, 56 Adt. 239 (Sup. Ct.
1903).
44. Changes in the federal statutory standards would require changes in the local
law, but this would not be too impractical, since changes in the federal statute as dis-
tinguished from regulations would be relatively infrequent. An in futuro adoption of
federal standards as well as of federal regulations would doubtless strike many courts
as being (assuming the "standards" approach to delegation is used) an invalid abdication
of the legislative function. It could no longer be said that the state had, either expressly
or impliedly, prescribed any standards of its own. The issue did not come up in the
OPA cases.
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poration in strict conformity with the general plan of development
and the additional 'primary standards' established by the signatory
states." '41
Such an independent prescription of standards is not likely to re-
sult in a state's unwittingly banning some unforeseen action that a
national administrator may in the future deem it advisable to take.
For the judicial trend in recent years in cases involving broad business
regulation is to sanction the most flexible kind of standards where the
nature of the.problem demands it. 46 At any rate, it is clear that an
express (if not necessarily detailed) statement of standards in the local
legislation is a safer method than that used in the local legislation pun-
ishing OPA violations.
(3) "Law of the land" theory: On the delegation issue, one element
of the reasoning of the Michigan court in People v. Sell, '1 and perhaps
the only element in the reasoning of the lower New York court, affirmed
without opinion in the Mailman case, was the principle that since the
federal requirements were already the "law of the land," applying in
both interstate and intrastate commerce, the scope of any delegation
was thereby minimized. The federal government was not being dele-
gated the authority to make new prohibitions applicable to intrastate
commerce; it already had authority over intrastate commerce under
the war power and had already applied its prohibitions thereto under
the Price Control Act. These Courts were therefore able to distinguish
the earlier unfavorable cases 19 on the ground that these earlier cases
involved federal statutes applicable only to interstate commerce. 49
45. Comment, Governmental Techniques for the Conservation and UtilLvalion of
Water Resources: An Analysis and Proposal, 56 YALE L. J. 276, 295 (1947).
46. "With the exception of the NRA and some of the first agricultural marketing
acts, almost no important administrative delegation has been disapproved. At least dele-
gation has been upheld where the task, if it is to be done at all, must be delegated and
where the 'standard' must of necessity be general." Jaffee, supra note 18, at 593. Federal
cases since the NRA cases demonstrate their exceptional character. See Fahey v. Mal-
lonee, 67 Sup. Ct. 1552 (U.S. 1947); American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 67 Sup.
Ct. 133 (1946); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); Opp Cotton Mills
v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126 (1941); United States v. Rock Royal Co-op, 307 U.S.
533 (1939).
47. 310 Mich. 305, 17 N.W.2d 193 (1945).
48. E.g., Darweger v. Staats, 267 N.Y. 290, 196 N.E. 61 (1935) (holding invalid
the New York adoption of federal NRA codes) ; Hutchins v. Mayo, 143 Fla. 707, 197
So. 495 (1940) (holding invalid the Florida adoption of future federal food and drug
grading regulations).
49. The Michigan and New York courts were also able to cite as authority, Common-
wealth v. Alderman, 275 Pa. 483, 119 Atl. 551 (1923), which upheld a Pennsylvania
liquor control law that defined the phrase "intoxicating liquors" as "anything found and
determined, from time to time, to be intoxicating by act of Congress passed pursuant to,
and in the enforcement of the Constitution of the United States." The court said: "The
above quoted statutory provisions do not present a delegation of legislative power contrary
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(4) Special theory of inter-goernmental relations: The two major the-
odes thus far suggested as usable in defense of the typical attempt at
adoption legislation have, perhaps, a somewhat unreal or strained
quality about them when applied to the problem at hand. Both the
"contingency" and the "standards" principles evolved from the at-
tempt of legislatures to allow an administrative servant of the same
sovereignty to take some action not feasible for the legislature itself
to take. And the legislature protected itself by (1) allowing the admin-
istrative determination to be a relatively minor, non-policy determina-
tion of a fact or contingency, which would then bring into play the
already "complete"policy determination of the legislature; or (2) by
outlining, in advance, the "standards" which would control any im-
portant action to be taken by the subordinate. Though cases have here
been cited in which these theories were applied to relations between
governments, the theories are more appropriate for the situation which
gave them birth: the fear of unrestrained, significant action by a sub-
ordinate. A state or municipal legislature passing a statute providing
to the Constitution of Pennsylvania, but simply an acceptance by our legislature of the
inevitable, an acknowledgment of that which the federal Supreme Court, interpreting the
Eighteenth Amendment... has pronounced the law of the land operative throughout the
entire territorial limits of the United States, and binding all legislative bodies, courts, pub-
lic officers and individuals within those limits. . . ." 275 Pa. 483, 486, 119 Atl. 551, 552. But
see: State v. Intoxicating Liquors, 121 Me. 438, 117 AUt. 58 (1922 ) ; Opinion of Justices,
239 Mass. 606, 133 N.E. 453 (1921). The same point was made by the Pennsylvania court in
the case of Holgate Bros. v. Bashore, 331 Pa. 255, 200 Ad. 672 (1933), involving a Pennsyl-
vania statute which prescribed maximum hours of labor and provided that "with respect to
any industry whose schedule of hours is established by Federal regulation, the schedule to be
fixed by the State Department of Labor and Industry with the approval of the Industrial
Board, shall conform to the schedule established by any such Federal regulatory body."
The Court held the act invalid and distinguished the Aldrmizan case by saying: "Under
national prohibition the state acts were merely augmentative. The national act, passed
pursuant to the eighteenth amendment, applied to everyone whether the states had their
own acts or not. Consequently all involved in the Alderman case -was a deference to the
superior authority of the federal law. ... But as to hours of labor the Federal govern-
ment cannot regulate beyond the field of interstate commerce. Beyond that lies the
exclusive province of the states. Therefore when the present act requires the hours
schedules of the Department to conform to those of some Federal authority it is to that
extent delegating its exclusive power to the Federal government." 331 Pa. 255, 269,
200 At. 672, 678. The reasoning of the Alderman case was followed by other Nzew
York courts besides the lower court in the Mailman case: Mosner %. Haddock, 46
N.Y.S2d 343 (Sup. Ct. 1944), aff'd without opinion, 263 App. Div. 752, 48 N. Y. S2d
802 (1st Dep't, 1944); Butter & Egg Merchants' Ass'n v. LaGuardia, 181 Misc. 889,
47 N.Y.S.2d 913 (Sup. Ct 1944); People v. Brongofsky, 50 N.Y.S.2d 32 (,Mag.
Ct 1943). Some of the language of the Michigan and New York courts indicates a
confusion between (a) the concept of minimized scope of the delegated power because
intrastate commerce is already subject to the identical prohibitions imposed under federal
power, and (b) the concept that state power over intrastate commerce being "exclusive"
cannot be delegated to the federal government. The latter notion, it is submitted, is subject
to question. See discussion of "consent" infra at pp. 20 ff.
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for action to be taken by an administrative official has, normally, no
way of knowing who the appointee will be and what policies he would be
inclined to follow if unrestrained. But a state or municipal legislature
is familiar enough with the announced political policies of an incum-
bent federal administration, knows the standards and purposes which
have been outlined in a particular piece of federal legislation (e.g. the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act) and may also know the identity
of the federal administrator, if already appointed. In the light of such
knowledge, and of the needs of its own state or city, the legislature may
reasonably deem it in the public welfare to adopt as its policy, a pro-
gram of having the local requirements exactly keep pace with the fed-
eral requirements. This identity may well seem more important to the
legislature than the fact that the federal regulations may now or later
include some requirements which it would not itself have authorized
originally. 11 And such an identity of requirements would be a locally
determined local policy, not a policy imposed by the federal govern-
ment. There is, in this view, no need to talk of "standards" or "con-
tingencies"; the focus of attention of the legislative will is not the de-
tailed, substantive federal requirements (it has already determined
that in general they comport with its own desires) but the desirability
of local-federal uniformity in a. particular field.
Several factors fortify such a consideration of the category of inter-
governmental relations as a proper exception to the traditional "stand-
ards" analysis of the delegation issue. In the first place, one important
intergovernmental relation-that between states and cities- has even
traditionally been treated as an exception to the usual analysis. Thus
it is not an invalid delegation for a state to delegate to a municipality
the broadest kind of governmental powers without standards more
restrictive than the preservation of the "health, safety and general
welfare" of the municipal population-though no clear theory has been
enunciated by the courts, which are apparently moved to uphold the
delegation by "immemorial practice" and the necessities of the situa-
50. Cf. Lehman, J., dissenting in Darveger v. Staats, 267 N. Y. 290, 315, 197 N.E.
61 (1935), which held the New York adoption of federal NRA codes invalid: "The
Legislature has not left to others the determination of the policy of the state, or what
regulations are wise and are calculated to remedy conditions which might otherwise in-
juriously affect the public welfare. It has said that, under present conditions and re-
gardless of the wisdom of a particular regulation, the public welfare requires that the
same regulations should be applied to interstate and intrastate business." And c/. Holmes,
J., dissenting in Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 169 (1919): "I as-
sume that Congress could not delegate to state legislatures the simple power to decide
what the law of the United States should be in that district. But when institutions are
established for ends within the power of the states and not for any purpose of affecting
the law of the United States, I take it to be an admitted power of Congress to provide




tion.51 Secondly, the intergovernmental relation on the international
plane has similarly been treated as a traditional exception. 02
Thirdly, there are a number of favorable cases involving federal-
state relations, in which the state legislation, though not typically cast
in the precise form of adoption and enforcement of federal require-
ments, did permit federal law to affect or determine state law-and
the legislation was upheld, either with no discussion of delegation or
cursory denials that an invalid delegation was involved, or assertions
that the local rather than the federal legislative will was the controlling
source of resulting local requirements. *3 Indeed the case-law does not
51. See, e.g., Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U.S. 141 (1899); Danville v. Hatcher,
101 Va. 523, 44 S.E. 723 (1903); Chicago v. Stratton, 162 IM. 494, 44 N.E. 853 (1896);
Wilson v. Compton Bond and Mtg. Co., 103 Ark. 452, 146 S.W. 110 (1912); State v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 56 Fla. 617, 47 So. 969 (1903); Ex parte Brewer, 63 Te.
Crim. 387, 152 S.V. 1068 (1913); GLEroRN, AD x n is..Tna LAw, CAsus A.= Conx-
mrxrs 207-9 (1940).
52. See authorities cited in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548, 597 (1935).
53. Thus state tax laws allowing the amount of the tax to depend on provisions of the
federal tax law have been generally upheld. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlin,
94 Conn. 47, 108 Atl. 154 (1919), aff'd, 254 U. S. 113 (1920); Brown Y. State, 323 Mo.
13S, 19 S. W.2d 12 (1929) ; Opinion of the Justices, 85 N.H. 572, 154 At. 633 (1931) ;
Hagood v. Doughton, 195 N.C. 811, 143 S.E. 841 (1928); Opinion of the Justices, 137
AUt. 50 (Maine, 1927); Gillum v. Johnson, 7 CaL2d 744, 62 P.2d 1037 (1936); In re
Thalmann's Estate, 177 Misc. 1055, 32 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Surr. Ct. 1941). But see Santee
Mills v. Query, 122 S.C. 158, 115 S.E. 202 (1922). The apparent dependence upon
Congress' future changes in the business of a national bank v.-as held not to invalidate a
state tax upon those who compete with the business of national banks, People ex rel.
Pratt v. Goldfogel, 242 N.Y. 277, 151 N.E. 452 (1926). A New York statute was upheld
which required that steam or electric railroads controlled by a foreign corporation charge
no more per mile for rides within New York City than the interstate rate from New
York City charged by such foreign corporation-which interstate rates were subject to
ICC control and could fluctuate from time to time. Transit Commission v. Long Island
K-R. Co., 248 App. Div. 749, 288 N.Y. Supp. 938 (2d Dep't 1936), aff'd, 272 N.Y. 27, 3
N.E.2d 622 (1936). A statute which, in order to obtain federal grants-in-aid, declared
that the state "accepts the provisions of any law of the United States making appropria-
tion to be apportioned among the states for vocational rehabilitation of disabled persons,"
was upheld in Watkinson v. Hotel Pennsylvania, 195 App. Div. 624, 187 N.Y. Supp. 278
(1921), aff'd, 231 N.Y. 562, 132 N.E. 889 (1921). See also Spahn v. Stev.art, 268 Ky.
97, 103 S.W2d 651 (1937). But see: Smithberger v. Banning, 129 Neb. 651, 262 N.!.
492 (1935); Illinois Power & L. Co. v. Centralia, 11 F. Supp. 874 (E. D. Ill. 1935),
vacated and remanded on other gronuds, 89 F.2d 985 (C.C.A. 7th 1937). A Kentucky
law was held valid, which was construed to make the pay of its state guard officers de-
pend on the pay of officers of the corresponding grades in the U.S. Army. James v'.
Walker, 141 Ky. 88 (1910) rehearing denied, 147 Ky. 646 (1912). But see Green v. At-
lanta, 162 Ga. 641, 135 S.E. 84 (1926). A regulation of a Virginia liquor board that
the consignee of liquor transported through Virginia must be one with a legal right to
receive the liquor at destination was attacked on the ground that "Virginia has not au-
thority to penalize prospective violations of the criminal laws of North Carolina or the
United States" (The U.S. laws being § 2 of the 21st Amendment and legislation passed
pursuant thereto prohibiting transportation of intoxicating liquor into a state for de-
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fully reveal the broad extent to which such state laws, adopting or
dependent upon federal provisions, have been enacted, 11
It is worthy of separate comment that in a few additional instances
livery or use therein in violation of its laws) but it was upheld by the Supreme Court
on the theory that compliance with the law of the U.S. or a sister state was an appro-
priate standard for Virginia's determination of who could safely be allowed to transport
liquor through her own territory. Carter v. Virginia, 321 U.S. 131 (1944). An Arizona
law that all those entitled to servicemen's benefits under the federal statute were free
from the disability of minors to make contracts was held not to delegate power unlaw-
fully. Valley National Bank of Phoenix v. Glover, 61 Ariz. 538, 159 P.2d 292 (1945).
The case of Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1 (U.S. 1820) concerned a Pennsylvania law
that state militiamen "neglecting or refusing to serve when called into actual service,
in pursuance of any order . . . of the President . . . shall be liable to the penalties de-
fined in the Act of Congress of the 28th of February, 1795, c. 227, or to any penalties
which may have'beer, prescribed since the date of that act, or which may hereafter be
prescribed by any law of the United States" and provided for trial by court martial.
The act, after being construed to give state military tribunals jurisdiction to enforce the
federal requirements rather than creating concurrent prohibitions and penalties was
upheld; but amid all the sharp divergencies of views expressed by the divided court,
no one urged that there was any unconstitutional infirmity because of delegation of
legislative power. There is some judicial authority (short of clear holding) apparently
accepting state adoption of federal food and drug standards. Smith v. Alphin, 150 N.C.
425, 64 S.E. 210 (1909); Cleveland Macaroni Co. v. State Bd. of Health, 256 Fed. 376
(N.D. Cal. 1919). But see Hutchins v. Mayo, 143 Fla. 707, 197 So. 495 (1940). In
Johnson v. Elliott, 168 S.W. 968 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) a state law was upheld under
which a license to sell non-alcoholic beverages in certain areas was made dependent upon
the applicant not being a federal liquor permittee. In State v. Brothers, 144 Minn. 337,
175 N.W. 685 (1919) the court answered "No" to the certified question whether a sec-
tion of the state law invalidly delegated legislative power to the federal government by
providing that it was intended to implement enforcement of the National Prohibition
Act; that its effective date would be January 16, 1920, but if the sale of intoxicating
liquor became illegal within the state by act of Congress prior thereto, the state law was
to be immediately effective; and that termination of the 18th Amendment would terminate
the state law. Not dissimilar is City of Pittsburgh v. Robb, 143 Ran. 1, 53 P.2d 203
(1936) upholding a statute regarding issuance of municipal bonds, which was to be
ineffective upon termination of National Industrial Recovery Act, and Howes Bros.
Co. v. Mass. Unem. Comp. Comm'n, 296 Mass. 275, 5 N.E.2d 720 (1936), cert. denied,
300 U.S. 657 (1937), upholding a state unemployment compensation law to be effective on
approval of the Social Security Board. Cf. on the latter point, Beeland Wholesale Co.
v. Kaufman, 234 Ala. 249, 174 So. 516 (1937).
During World War II there was widespread adoption by cities (and a good many
convictions thereunder) of the "Model Ordinance on Black-outs and Air-Raid Protec-
tion," recommended by the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers. The ordinance
among other things authorized and directed the Mayor, or appropriate local officials "to
carry out black-outs and air raid protection measures . . . at such times and for such
periods as are authorized or ordered by the Army or Navy ... ." See NATIONAL INSTI-
TUTE OF MUNICIPAL LAW OFFIcERs, MUNICIPALITIEs AND THE LAW IN Acro IN 1941
109-11 (1942).




there were suggestions of a doctrine of state "consent". "I This is par-
ticularly significant in the light of the now entrenched "consent" doc-
trine sometimes used in a fourth group of cases, those upholding federal
legislation adopting state laws or permitting them to operate in what
would otherwise be a federal sphere-some of these cases being more
55. In United States v. Bek-ins, 304 U.S. 27, 47, 51-3 (1938), Cliapter X of the
Bankruptcy Act, enacted in 1937 and providing for composition of indebtedness of taxing
agencies or instrumentalities described therein, was held not to be an "unconstitutional
interference with the essential independence of the State as preserved by the Constitution"
for the reason that "the State has given its consent." This consent was given by a 1934
California statute granting the right to taxing districts to file the composition petition
mentioned in the Bankruptcy Act "as amended from time to time," and the instant case
involved the 1937 amendment. The Court observed: "It is of the essence of sovereignty
to be able to make contracts and give consents bearing upon the exertion of governmental
power. This is constantly illustrated in treaties and conventions in the international
field by which governments yield their freedom of action in particular matters in order
to gain the benefits which accrue from international accord. Oppenheim, International
Law, 4th ed., vol. 1, §§ 493, 494; Hyde, International Law, vol. 2 § 489; Perry v. United
States, 294 U.S. 330, 353. .. . The State is free to make contracts with individuals and
give consents upon which the other contracting party may rely ith rcspect to a par-
ticidar itse of governmental authority. . . . While the instrumentalities of the national
government are immune from taxation by a state, the state may tax them if the national
government consents (Baltimore Nat. Bank -v. State Tax Con m'n, 297 U.S. 209, 211,
212) and by a parity of reasoning the consent of the State could remoe the obstacle to
the taxation by the federal government of state agencies to -which the consent applied.
"Nor did the formation of an indestructible Union of indestructible States make im-
possible cooperation between the Nation and the States through the exercise of the power
of each to the advantage of the people who are citizens of both..." Id. at 51-3
(italics added).
In Hopkins Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Cleary, 296 U.S. 315 (1935), the Court
held that the conversion of Wisconsin building and loan associations into federal asso-
ciations under the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 which provided for such conversion
without requiring the state's consent was "of no effect when voted against the protest of
Wisconsin," Id. at 343, it being an "illegitimate encroachment by the government of the
nation upon a domain of activity set apart by the Constitution as the province of the
states." Id. at 338. The whole opinion strongly implies, however, that state consent
would have validated the federal action.
The cases of Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937), and Carmichael V.
Southern Coal Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937), upheld federal and state taxes respectively,
levied pursuant to the federal social-security plan. The Court rejected in both cases
the argument that the state had been unlawfully "coerced" through the system of federal
credits into enacting its unemployment compensation law and surrendering important
powers to the federal government. The Court said in the Carmichael case that "the
deposit by the state of its compensation fund in the Unemployment Trust Fund involves
no more of a surrender of sovereignty than does the choice of any other depository for
state funds. The power to contract and the power to select appropriate agencies and
instrumentalities for the execution of state policy are attributes of state sovereignty. They
are not lost by their exercise." Id. at 526. It said in the Steward case that "the inference
of abdication thus dissolves in thinnest air when the deposit is conceived of as dependent
upon a statutory consent ... The states are at liberty, upon obtaining the consent of
Congress, to make agreements with one another. Constitution, Art. I, § 10, par. 3 ...
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or less explicitly based on a "consent" theory, 11 while others were
based on the same kind of fragmentary rationale mentioned in the
preceding paragraph. 5
We find no room for doubt that they may do the like with Congress if the essence of their
statehood is maintained without impairment. . . ." 301 U.S. 548, 597. Indication has
previously been made, note 42 sitpra, of the cases in which the federal use of state officials
for performance of federal duties has been held proper because of state consent.
56. The most recent and definitive case is Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328
U.S. 408 (1946). A South Carolina 3% tax on premiums of foreign insurance com-
panies from business within the state, imposed without reference to whether the transac-
tions were local or interstate, was upheld against the claim that it discriminated against
interstate commerce, since whatever merit the claim would have was dissipated by con-
gressional consent given in the Act of March 9, 1945, 59 STAT. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1011-5, (Supp. 1946). This act (passed after interstate insurance transactions had
been subjected to the federal commerce power by United States v. South-Eastern Un-
derwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944)) declared that the continued state regulation and
taxation of the insurance business was in the public interest, that Congressional silence
was not to be construed as barring such regulation, that the insurance business and per-
sons engaged therein "shall be subject to the laws of the several states which relate to
the regulation or taxation of such business"; and that no federal act, unless it specifically
relates to insurance, is to be construed as impairing state laws regulating or taxing
insurance. 59 STAT. 33, 34 (1945).
The Court used a consent theory, which it regarded as explaining various previous
decisions; it was "the very basis on which the second Wheeling Bridge case and indeed
the Clark Distilling case have set the pattern of the law for governing situations like
that now presented," 328 U.S. 408, 427, though the consent doctrine was not expressed
as such in these cases. The Wheeling Bridge case (State of Pennsylvania v. Wheeling
and Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 421 (U.S. 1855)) upheld a federal law validating
certain bridges which the Court had previously held to be an obstruction to navigation,
The case of Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry., 242 U.S. 311 (1917), upheld the
Webb-Kenyon Act prohibition against shipment in interstate commerce of intoxicating
liquor into any state where intended to be received, used, etc., in violation of the law of
that state. A law similar to the Webb-Kenyon Act, but applying to convict-made goods
(Ashurst-Sumners Act) was upheld in Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v, Illinois Central
R. Co., 299 U.S. 334 (1937), and one with respect to interstate shipments of dentures con-
structed from casts not made by or under authority of a dentist licensed under the destina-
tion state, where that state restricts construction or supply of dentures to its own licensed
dentists, was sustained in United States v. Johnson, 149 F.2d 53 (CC.A. 7th 1945), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 722 (1945). The Lacey Act of 1900 prohibiting interstate shipment of
animals or birds killed in violation of local laws was sustained in Rupert v. United States,
181 Fed. 87 (C.C.A. 8th 1910), and Congress has successfully used the same technique in
connection with interstate commerce in stolen motor cars, Brooks v. United States, 267
U.S. 432 (1925), oil produced in excess of state quotas, Griswold v. President of U.S., 82
F.2d 922 (C.C.A. 5th 1936), Genecov v. Fed. Petrol. Bd., 146 F.2d 596 (C.C.A. 5th
1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 865 (1945), and interstate transportation of persons unlaw-
fully kidnapped, Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124 (1936). A related type of law-
divesting goods of their interstate character upon arrival in the state even though still in
the original package-was sustained with respect to liquor in In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545
(1891) and with respect to convict-made goods in Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U.S. 431
(1936). The provision (§ 1606(a)) of the Internal Revenue Code that "no person re-
quired under a state law to make payments to an unemployment fund shall be relieved
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These "consent" cases may have a special significance: if Congress
may validly consent to operation of state laws in an admittedly federal
sphere (i. e. one which in the absence of consent, would be barred to
the states by the Constitution) then perhaps there is no logical reason
why a state cannot consent to the operation of federal laws in an ad-
from compliance therewith on the ground that he is engaged in interstate or foreign com-
merce or that the state law does not distinguish between employers engaged in interstate
or foreign commerce and those engaged in intrastate commerce," was upheld in Perkins v.
Pennsylvania, 314 U.S. 586 (1942), afflr)in;q on notion 342 Pa. 529, 21 A2d 45 (1941) ;
Standard Dredging Co. v. Murphy, 319 U.S. 306 (1943); International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
57. Thus where the amount of a federal tax was made to depend upon provisions of
the law in particular states, it was declared that "such variations do not infringe the
constitutional prohibitions against delegation of the taxing power....n Phillips v.
Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 283 U.S. 589, 602 (1931). Congress may with respect to
federal elections properly punish violations by state officials of their election duties under
state law, the latter being considered as in effect "adopted" by Congress. Ex Parta
Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 387-9 (1879) (the in futuro aspect of the adoption is not clear in
the case and was not discussed as such). There are provisions in the federal code to the
effect that where an act not specifically subject to punishment under federal law is in
violation of the laws of the state in question, the offender shall be subject to the same
punishment as is provided for such an offense by the state laws in force at the time of
commission of the offense. Conviction under such a provision was affirmed by the Su-
preme Court without discussion of delegation, in Burns v. United States, 274 U.S. 328
(1927). In United States v. Paul, 6 Pet. 141 (U.S. 1832) and Franklin %. United States,
216 U.S. 559 (1910), where early laws of the same type as that in the Burns case, sura,
did not explicitly indicate, as does the statute in the latter case, that the state laws re-
ferred to were those existing at the time of the offense, the Court interpreted the statute
as referring to the state laws existing at the time of passage of the federal law. It
should be noted that in the Burns case there had apparently been no change in the
"adopted" California statute between the date of the federal statute and the date of the
offense. In United States v. Mason, 213 U.S. 115 (1909), while declaring REV. STAT.,
§5509 inapplicable to the particular case, the Court said it was not improper for that
section "to so measure the punishment for the Federal offense as to make it equal to the
punishment prescribed by the State for the crime committed against the State in the
act of violating the Federal law." Id. at 124. Where the Act of 1789 had declared that
pilots should continue to be regulated in conformity "with such laws as the states may
respectively hereafter enact for the purpose until further legislative provision shall be
made by Congress," an 1803 Pennsylvania law regulating pilotage was upheld in Cooley
v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299 (U.S. 1851), on the theory that the nature of the
subject-matter was not such as to require uniform, exclusive federal regulation. Ex-
emption and priority provisions of state laws in force at the time of filing of a bank-
ruptcy petition have been adopted as controlling in federal bankruptcy legislation and
this was declared to be not an invalid delegation. Hanover Nat. Bank v. Moyses, 186
U.S. 181, 190 (1902). The Conformity Act, predecessor of the Federal Rules, provided
for conformity of procedure in federal court cases to the procedure prevailing at the
time of the case, in similar state court cases. This has innumerable times been applied
by the courts, with scarcely any question raised as to its validity. Beers v. Haughton,
10 Wheat. 51 (U.S. 1825); Army v. Watertown, 130 U.S. 301 (1839). So, too, the
requirement that federal jurors have the same qualifications and exemptions as thoze
applicable to state jurors at the time when the federal jurors are summoned has been
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mittedly state sphere.5" A few decisions pointing in the direction of a
state consent theory have been indicated 19 but the analogous federal
consent cases offer stronger support, for the rationale has been firmly
established ever since Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin; 10 and it
goes at least as far in granting free scope to the other sovereignty as do
the theories of "delegation" or "adoption" (which the Supreme Court
said was not present in the Prudential case).61 The consent theory need
applied again and again withoift question (see, e.g., Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328
U.S. 217 (1946)). For a review of early federal statutes (on jurors, marshals, pro-
cedure, criminal laws, etc.) which were made dependent on present and prospective state
provisions for their operation and the course of judicial decision by which the validity of
such early legislation was generally upheld, often without discussion of the delegation
point, see Barnett, Delegation of Legislative Power By Congress to the States, 2 AM.
POL. Sci. REv. 347 (1907). See also Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. 119
(1905), which upheld Congress' delegation to local legislatures and to miners within
mining districts of the power to make supplementary regulations regarding location, etc.,
of claims on public lands (the Court describing the regulations as "minor and subordi-
nate"). Also worth noting are such provisions as 27 STAT. 449, 42 U.S.C. § 81 (1893) ; 20
STAT. 37, 42 U.S.C. § 86 (1878); 25 STAT. 355, 42 U.S.C. § 106 (1888), penalizing nonl-
compliance by vessels with local health and quarantine regulations; 41 STAT. 1073, 16
U.S.C. § 812 (1920), providing for compliance with applicable state regulations as a con-
dition to a license under the Federal Power Act. For a restrictive reading of this latter
clause see First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power Commission, 328
U.S. 152 (1946). Of interest is also § 10(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947,
Pub. L. No. 101 (June 23, 1947), authorizing the NLRB to "cede ...jurisdiction" to state
agencies in some disputes "even though ... affecting commerce," and § 14(b) making
federal legality of "union shop" agreements dependent on legality under state law. And see
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Bethlehem Steel Co. v. N. Y. State Labor
Relations Board, 67 Sup. Ct 1026, 1032 (1947).
58. The proposition that a doctrine of federal consent to state action in a federal
sphere implies the complementary doctrine of state consent to federal action in a state
sphere may be disputed on the theory that federal and state power are fundamentally
different in character: the argument runs that federal consent merely leaves the field
open for the operation of a pre-existing and plenary state police power, whereas the
federal government can exercise only those powers specifically enumerated by the Con-
stitution and hence is incapable of exercising an unenumerated power notwithstanding
state consent to such exercise. The counter-argument is that "plenary" state power does
not come into play unless the Constitution has failed to give Congress authority over the
matter in question. If the Constitution has given authority to Congress, the "plenary" nature
of state police power is unavailing. The Constitution apparently stands in the way, no less
than it apparently stands in the way of a federal attempt to exercise an unenumerated power.
Hence when the Supreme Court permits Congress to consent to state power over a federal
sphere (e.g., interstate commerce), it is doing so in spite of a seeming constitutional bar to
state power. So too, it may be urged, a state may consent to federal power over a state
sphere (e.g. intrastate commerce) in spite of a seeming constitutional barrier.
9. See note'55 supra.
60. 328 U. S. 408 (1946). See Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power-
Revised Version, 47 COL. L. REv. 547, 560 (1947).
61. The Court observes (328 U.S. 408, 438): "The argument grounded upon the
first clause of Article I, § 8, requiring that excises shall be uniform throughout the United
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not of course swallow up all constitutional limitations. At least one re-
striction is that voiced by the New York Court of Appeals in upholding
a state reciprocal tax law (on the "contingency" theory): that there
be some responsible "legislative judgment" as to "expediency," some
"dependent or causative connection between the domestic and the
foreign law," 6, 2-or, stating it in the form of the broader, familiar
criterion for testing validity of legislative action, that there be a non-
arbitrary basis for the consent.
There is still another indication in the precedents that the traditional
"standards" analysis for intragovernmental delegation is inappropriate
for intergovernmental relations. Recurrent in some of the opinions
previously referred to is the observation that the one sovereignty has
not delegated its sovereign function to the other because it can always
repeal the authority it has given. 13 This seems to be an unexpressed
recognition that intergovernmental relations should be treated differ-
ently when it comes to the delegation issue. For obviously if this power-
of-repeal theory were applicable to intragovernment delegation, the
States, identifies the state exaction with the laying of an excise by Congress, to which
alone the limitation applies. This is done on the theory that no more has occurred than
that Congress has 'adopted' the tax as its own, a conception which obviously ignores the
state's exertion of its own power and, furthermore, seeks to restrict the coordinated
exercise of federal and state authority by a limitation applicable only to the federal tax-
ing power when it is exerted without reference to any state action. The same observa-
tion applies also to the contention based on Article I, § 1." "The related contention
that Congress' 'adoption' of South Carolina's statute amounts to an unconstitutional dele-
gation of Congress' legislative power to the states obviously confuses Congress' power to
legislate with its power to consent to state legislation. They are not identical, though
exercised in the same formal manner. See Clark Distilling Co. %v. Western Maryland
R., 242 U.S. 311, 327." 328 U.S. 40S, 438, n. 51.
Paraphrasing this position, an- intergovernmental adoption or delegation makes the
one legislature continually responsible for the consequences of the e.xercise of power by
the other; the foreign law becomes its own law. On the other hand, legislative consent
constitutes a conferring of both power and responsibility: in the exercise of its plenary
power over a particular subject matter the one sovereignty determines that it will allow
the other, subject to its power of repeal, to take over that subject matter completely.
Surely, then, the consent doctrine assumes more of a concession or abdication of "sov-
ereignty" than the delegation or adoption concepts. A court which freely accepts the
former doctrine could not logically reject the latter concepts on sovereignty grounds. It
was apparently not the sovereignty issue which concerned the Court in the Prudential
case. Once the state tax .as viewed as having been adopted by Congress, there would
have been not only the unintended result of two sets of taxes but the serious obstacle of
Article I, § 8, to non-uniform federal excises. This could no longer have been met by
stressing the "state's exertion of its own power." Nor would it be logically met by the
other element in the Court's reasoning, appropriately paraphrased: that the constitutional
restriction applies to the laying by Congress of an excise specifically set forth, and not
when it lays it by reference to a state tax.
62. People v. Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia, 92 N.Y. 311 (183), aff'd, 119 U.S. 110
(1886). See note 33 supra.
63. See City of Tex:arkana v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 306 U.S. 188, 197 (1939);
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typical delegation to an administrative agency could never be held
invalid.
In short, a sizable body of precedent exists for the invocation of an
"intergovernmental relations" exception to the usual delegation analy-
sis. And even on the usual analysis, as already shown, intergovern-
mental delegations or adoptions are defensible. Already at least two
prominent students14 have criticized the cases6" which underlie the
comment that "it is generally held that the adoption by or under au-
thority of a state statute of prospective Federal legislation, or Federal
administrative rules thereafter to be passed, constitutes an unconsti-
tutional delegation of legislative power." 11 It is submitted that the
rule should and will give way with the years.
(The concluding section of this article will appear in the next number of
the JOURNAL.)
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 592-3, 594-6 (1937) ; Carmichael v. So,
Coal Co., 301 U.S. 495, 526 (1937); Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 242
U.S. 311, 326 (1917) ; Ex parte Laswell, 1 Cal. App. 2d 183, 36 P. 2d 678, 687 (1934).
64. GELLHORN, CASES AND COMMENTS or ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 220 (1940): "When
* .. a statute is designed to absorb content from extra-state action, the superior-sub-
ordinate relationship is no longer present, since the extra-state agency is not subject to
the control of the enacting legislature. For this reason, specificity of command should
no longer be the measure of the statute's adequacy. Rather, emphasis should be placed
upon the statute's containing a sufficiently precise statement of the source and character
of the contemplated extra-state action, so that there may be a ready determination whether
the action in fact taken is the type of action which the legislature intended to affect the
operation of the original enactment. In other words, the inquiry should shift from the
question, 'Has the legislature controlled the act of the subordinate?', to the question,
'Has the legislature furnished enough criteria so that the extrinsic legislation may be
identified as the legislation to which the domestic policy is to conform?'"
1 SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 310 (3d ed. 1943) : "The
better view favors the validity of the statute in all three circumstances [i.e. (1) adop-
tion of another sovereignty's existing legislation; (2) making legislation contingent upon
another sovereignty's adoption of a law; (3) adoption of prospective legislation of an-
other sovereignty.] Even in the third situation where another legislature may change
not only the operation of local law but its substantive content, the statute should be sus-
tained for its enactment has not amdunted to any permanent loss of sovereignty or legis-
lative power. It is possible that for a period of time after the change in the "foreig~
statute!' and before the local legislature convenes, the law of the jurisdiction may not
reflect local legislative desires; but this is so even with regard to purely local enact-
ments. The local legislature retains its power to change the statute if it is not satis-
factory. The advantages gained by uniformity of law between the states and the ad-
vantage of uniformity with congressional legislation, to say nothing of protection against
retaliatory legislation, outweighs the disadvantages which may temporarily arise from
changes in foreign laws."
65. See note 10 supra)
66. Note, 133 A.L.R. 401 (1941).
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